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The Continuation of Phenomenology: A Fifth Period? 
 





In this article, the author takes a reflective look at the past, present and future of phenomenology 
in a kind of Presidential ‘state of the science’ approach. The Encyclopedia of Phenomenology acts 
as the authoritative positional backdrop for this ground-breaking paper. Embree isolates several 
recognizable ‘stages’ in the development of phenomenology, and ponders whether its current 
growth (and permutations) is not leading us into a new stage. If so, this has implications for the 




As leader of the team that edited the Encyclopedia of 
Phenomenology, I was amongst the first concretely to 
recognize how complex, extensive, and dynamic the 
phenomenological tradition actually is.1 By now, of 
course, this work is out there for all to read, and the 
several long reviews in English, French, Japanese, 
and Spanish show that I am not the only one who has 
been drawn into pondering this entire tradition.2 
 
In this essay I want to report on some aspects of our 
effort that are not especially obvious in the 
encyclopedic work and to suggest ways in which the 
phenomenological tradition can be carried further by 
those who are, like me, interested in fostering its 
continuation. My purposes are not theoretical (I doubt 
                                                          
1 Embree, L., et al., (1997). (Eds.). Encyclopedia of 
phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
2 See, for instance, reviews by Carlos Buscarini (1988) in 
Escritos de Filosofia; by Philippe Cabestan (1998) in 
Alter: Revue de Phenomenologie, No. 6; by Robert 
Sokolowski (1998) in Husserl Studies, Vol. 15; and 
finally by WADA, Wataru (1999) in Genshogaku 
Nenpo, the Annual Review of the Phenomenological 
Association of Japan, Vol. 15. 
I can muster the detachment for that); instead, they 
are practical. 
 
A Planetary and Multidisciplinary tradition 
The first concern in editing an encyclopedia is 
selecting the topics for entries. An initial list was 
made and the original estimate was for 100 entries. 
However, we just kept finding more and more forms 
of phenomenology and relevant specialists to write 
about them, so that we ended up with 166. We 
decided at the outset to have a thematic rather than a 
biographical emphasis, and thus wound up including 
entries on only twenty-eight figures along with the 
forty thematic entries that are actually the core of the 
work. In addition, we included entries on figures (e.g., 
Foucault and Jaspers) and tendencies (e.g., 
structuralism) that had early connections with 
phenomenology, but that could ultimately not be 
considered phenomenological. We also included 
some traditions (e.g., analytical philosophy and 
Marxism) and some figures (such as Hegel and Kant) 
who had even less historical connection with 
phenomenology, but with which useful comparisons 
and contrasts could nevertheless be made. 
 
Setting the 118 entries of the mentioned types aside, 
there remain forty-eight entries of an historical kind: 
four devoted to tendencies and stages within 
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philosophical phenomenology; twenty-one devoted to 
phenomenological tendencies in non-philosophical 
disciplines; and twenty-three devoted to national 
traditions chiefly of philosophical phenomenology. 
My remarks here are based on these forty-eight 
historical entries. But before I say anything more, I 
should mention that I am neither by talent nor by 
training an historian. Nevertheless, the entries of the 
sorts I am drawing upon do tend to proceed with 
historical concerns for such issues as when a series of 
events began, who did what and when, and what the 
chief philosophical sources for the non-philosophical 
tendencies that have emerged are. And when I review 
these forty-eight entries together, some patterns do 
clearly emerge. My larger historical sketch is 
therefore based on these several dozen smaller 
historical accounts.  
 
Phenomenology begins late in the 1890s with 
Edmund Husserl. The decisive act consists in 
transcending his teacher Brentano’s immanentism: 
although all immediate objects of awareness had 
previously been considered to have “existence in” 
conscious life, they now come to be seen instead as 
transcendent of that life, yet still directly accessible to 
our awareness. The chair across the room, for 
example, is not an image in my mind standing for 
something to which I cannot have direct access; rather 
it is something over there that I directly encounter by 
seeing it and can also encounter by walking over and 
sitting on it. The era of epistemological 
representationalism that is thereby left behind - and 
the interpretation of the physical sciences that 
engendered and supported this epistemology ever 
since Descartes - does not need to be rehearsed on 
this occasion. But it is astounding to consider that so 
many great minds took for granted what now, after 
Husserl, can seem preposterous. 
 
Husserl’s initial positive interest was with the 
philosophies of logic and mathematics, which can be 
collectively termed formal sciences.3 His Logische 
Untersuchungen of 1900-1901 included not only a 
name-making refutation of logical psychologism, but 
also contained extensive analyses of the mental 
operations in which numbers, propositions, and akin 
objects, which are not inherent parts of mental 
operations, are intended to or constituted in various 
ways.  
 
The period of the phenomenological tradition that 
then arose in Germany - a period (and tendency) that 
is best called realistic phenomenology - will be 
                                                          
3  Seebohm, T. M., Follesdal, D., & Mohanty, J. N. (1991). 
(Eds.). Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
discussed presently. At this point it can be said that 
Husserl’s new approach has its first major 
philosophical influence outside Germany through the 
work of Nishida Kitaro in Japan, who went on to send 
a number of students to Freiburg to study with 
Husserl during the 1920s. The Japanese tradition 
languished during the 1930s and 1940s for political 
reasons, but was revived by the 1960s, and is quite 
vigorous today. 
 
Phenomenology was also planted in Russia before 
World War I and continued to grow as something of 
an underground tradition during the Soviet period; 
there is now hope for a new flourishing there. 
Moreover, phenomenology can be seen to begin in 
Spain early in the 20th century with the work of 
Ortega y Gasset; from there it spread to Latin 
America between and after the wars through efforts 
by Manuel Garcia Morante, Jose Gaos, Joaquin 
Xirau, Francisco Romero, Antonio Caso, Eduardo 
Nicol, Xavier Zubiri, Roberto Walton, Javier San 
Martin, Antonio de Almeida, and quite a few others. 
 
Besides this geographical dissemination of 
phenomenology, there is also a spreading of 
phenomenology from philosophy to other disciplines, 
which can provisionally be referred to as “non-
philosophical disciplines”. The Encyclopedia includes 
entries on twenty-two of these disciplines, and no 
doubt we missed a number of them, especially of the 
evaluational and practical disciplines. Even though 
philosophy has tended to lead, there is undoubtedly 
more Phenomenology outside philosophy than within 
it. The beginning here was also just before World 
War I and consisted of phenomenology spreading into 
psychiatry in the early work of Karl Jaspers and in the 
life long involvement of Ludwig Binswanger. Today 
there is an impressive international tradition of 
phenomenological psychiatry, chiefly led from France 
and Germany. 
 
The more than a score of other non-philosophical 
tendencies began later. There is insufficient time on 
this occasion to name further individuals, but the 
disciplines, as well as the national traditions, into 
which phenomenology spread from Husserl’s 
beginning can at least be mentioned for the 
subsequent decades. 
 
During the 1920s there is evidence of phenomenology 
- and especially of philosophical phenomenology - in 
Australia, France, Hungary, The Netherlands and 
Flanders, Poland, and the United States.  
Phenomenology can also be identified in the many 
non-philosophical disciplines that focused on 
communication, education, gender, music, and 
religion. Then the 1930s saw phenomenology begin 
in Czechoslovakia, Italy, Korea, and Yugoslavia, and 
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in reflections on architecture, literature, and theatre as 
well. That makes at least nine non-philosophical 
disciplines and more than twelve nations (the many 
Latin American nations have not been mentioned by 
name) in Europe, the New World, and Asia before 
World War II (which is not to assert that all of the 
non-philosophical sub-disciplines were necessarily 
represented in all of the nations mentioned, although 
phenomenological philosophy certainly was). 
 
During the 1940s and 1950s, phenomenology spread 
to Portugal, the Nordic countries, and South Africa, 
and also into reflections on ethnicity, film, sociology, 
and politics. In the 1960s and 1970s, it spread to 
Canada, China, and India, and to dance, geography, 
law, and psychology. And finally, in the 1980s and 
1990s, it spread at last to Great Britain as well as to 
economics, environmentalism, ethnology, medicine, 
and nursing. 
 
Not only is the planetary and multidisciplinary spread 
of phenomenology during the 20th century impressive, 
but for the century as a whole, it seems that only 
psychoanalysis and Marxism might be compared with 
it in these respects - and both of those have seen 
better days, while phenomenology continues to thrive. 
If one considers all the countries and disciplines 
involved, it can be said that phenomenology is the 
philosophical tradition of the 20th century. 
 
I might insert here that when I have made this point 
on previous occasions in the United States, I have 
been interrupted with the question: What about 
analytical philosophy? My answer, which tends to 
silence the room, is that analytical philosophy is 
indeed also a century-old tradition in philosophy, but 
has chiefly thrived in the former British empire, i.e., 
Great Britain and its former colonies, the United 
States included, which is where English is spoken and 
where Oxford and Cambridge are considered to be the 
most prestigious universities. In contrast, however, 
phenomenology is a planetary and quite polyglot 
tradition. Analytical philosophy is an ethno-regional 
manifestation tied to a language and is thus akin to 
neo-Confucianism. 
 
It can also be wondered if the analytical tradition has 
the relatively continuous as well as broad and deep 
flow of ideas from philosophy to the non-
philosophical disciplines that phenomenology has. 
Unfortunately, all I can do is to pose the question and 
to hope that somebody else can answer it 
authoritatively. The idea of positivism, whereby the 
“moral sciences” ought to be pursued after the fashion 
of the naturalistic sciences, comes from the 19th 
Century and does still seem to predominate in the 
cultural sciences, but its continual endorsement within 
naturalistic theory of science is not a continuous, 
wide, and deep flow of ideas. 
 
It ought not to be surprising that there is a great deal 
of national and disciplinary myopia within 
phenomenology, which is to say that we tend to focus 
upon what is happening in our own disciplines and 
countries. The delight one can feel when finding out 
about developments in other countries already 
indicates this. Thus with the exception of sociology 
(where, as a consequence of Alfred Schutz’s thought,  
there clearly are American, German, and Japanese 
traditions) the greatest weakness of our encyclopedia 
concerns the entries on the non-philosophical 
disciplines. Most of these were written by Americans 
and Western Europeans because the personal 
networks through which the editorial team of 
philosophers recruited authors of entries was also 
chiefly made up of Americans and Western 
Europeans. Beyond that, most of the American 
colleagues in the non-philosophical disciplines were 
relatively less well acquainted with disciplinary 
colleagues in other countries, presumably because 
they were preoccupied with their struggles within 
their larger and less friendly disciplines. The situation 
seems to be somewhat better for philosophers in the 
NATO area, where more international travel as well 
as multiple language skills seem to obtain. Here, there 
are numerous opportunities for further development, 
and specific suggestions will be made below. 
 
Stages of philosophical phenomenology 
To give the above sketch a bit more substance, let me 
add remarks based on the introduction that Jitendra 
Mohanty and I wrote for the encyclopedia which was 
edited by the Center for Advanced Research in 
Phenomenology. Composing the introduction was one 
of our last tasks - in part because we needed to see the 
whole first, but also because that whole became 
increasingly overwhelming! After pondering for 
weeks how to compose an overview that could lead 
into the whole, yet would not be hopelessly 
superficial, it occurred to me one day while driving to 
the university that rather than trying to summarize the 
results of phenomenological work, we might simply 
report on the growth and revision of the agenda of 
issues and approaches contained in the history of 
phenomenology. Let me now summarize that quickly 
in relation to the four “stages” cum “tendencies” that 
are roughly discernible. Most of these agenda items 
are subjects of entries in the encyclopedia 
 
(1) In addition to the formal sciences, the topics of 
language, perception, and re-presentation (memory, 
empathy, expectation, and imagination) have been on 
the agenda since the turn of the century.  In  realistic 
phenomenology that predominated immediately 
before and after World War I, the items of gender, 
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law, philosophical anthropology, religion, and value 
were added to the agenda, as were then also 
aesthetics, architecture, music, and literature, and, 
later, film. The eidetic method, whereby knowledge 
of universal essences is gained, is central for realistic 
phenomenology, which is not only a stage within the 
history of phenomenology, but also a tendency that 
has continued throughout the rest of the century. 
 
(2) Constitutive phenomenology is one of the names 
Husserl gave his mature philosophy, which first 
emerged in print in 1913. The transcendental 
phenomenological epoche, reduction, and lastly 
purification then became methodologically central, 
and the issues of the body and of the philosophies of 
the naturalistic and cultural sciences were added to 
the agenda. That agenda retained the previous issues, 
but the entire agenda was reordered in such a way that 
the grounding of the positive sciences in a 
transcendental ‘first’ philosophy became central. I 
personally consider it unfortunate that so many non-
Husserlian phenomenologists reject this interest in the 
philosophy not only of the formal and cultural 
sciences, but also of the naturalistic sciences.4 
Nevertheless, this tendency too continues as a way of 
practising phenomenology. 
 
(3) Late in the 1920s there arose what is best called 
existential phenomenology. This happened through a 
misunderstanding of the intentions of Heidegger’s 
main work, Sein und Zeit and may have begun with 
Hannah Arendt’s thesis on love in St. Augustine. 
Although there were parallels in Japan during the 
1920s, this third tendency within philosophical 
phenomenology chiefly predominated in France 
during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. Literature - 
especially theatre - and gender were raised higher on 
the agenda; in addition, ethnicity, politics, and, most 
interestingly, old age were added within an overall 
refocusing on the actualities of human life or 
existence. This stage can also be seen as a tendency 
that continued even when it no longer predominates.  
 
(4) With the post-World War II restoration of 
phenomenology in Germany, the fourth tendency 
came to predominance during the 1960s into the 
1990s. This is hermeneutical phenomenology and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur have been, of 
course, the leading European figures, while Joseph 
Kockelmans has been the central figure in the United 
States. This tendency appreciates Heidegger’s 
methodology of interpretation. All of the previously 
mentioned items, except, perhaps, gender, are still on 
                                                          
4 Hardy, L., & Embree, L. (1992). (Eds.).  Phenomenology 
of Natural Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
the agenda, and technology and environmentalism 
have clearly been added. 
 
As mentioned, all four tendencies have continued 
since their inception and the “stages” mentioned are 
based on temporary predominances of one or another 
revision of the agenda and/or methodological 
emphasis. By the 1990s, however, philosophical 
phenomenological had become heavily burdened with 
the past in a way that fosters ignorance. Those 
involved in different tendencies try less and less to 
keep up with developments in sister tendencies and 
sometimes even with the work of more than one or 
two figures. Efforts are necessary to remember 
aspects of the century-deep past.5 And it seems to me 
from my limited perspective that after about forty 
years hermeneutical phenomenology has become less 
methodologically self-conscious, and indeed has 
begun to degenerate into a mere style of scholarship 
on texts from the history of philosophy rather than 
investigation of the matters themselves. Heidegger’s 
now utterly unignorable Nazism has not helped. It is 
also not clear that deconstructionism can genuinely 
claim to be phenomenological. 
 
I will speculate about a new and fifth stage in the 
history of phenomenology presently. 
 
The questions of approach and field 
The multiplicity of methods, as well as the growing 
number of issues on the agenda (and those for the 
agendas of the non-philosophical disciplines have not 
even been touched on), can lead one to wonder about 
the unity of the phenomenological tradition. That this 
tradition is indeed a unitary one can be shown in two 
ways above and beyond adducing the purely historical 
circumstances that members of a tradition chiefly turn 
to other members for ideas; namely, unity can be 
shown (i) with a sketch of a widely shared approach 
and (ii) with an overall characterization of the field of 
matters approached, which is a procedure that is itself 
an attempt at a phenomenological rather than an 
historical answer.  
 
Late in the encyclopedia project, I remembered 
something I used to urge on graduate students 
studying historical figures: if you think you 
understand a figure’s position, you should try to 
characterize its opposite. Remembering that, I tried it 
on phenomenology and easily concluded that its 
opposite was what Husserl called objectivism, which 
is what many call positivism, but which might best be 
called naturalism (and I quickly added an entry with 
that title). Naturalism is, of course, a world view 
                                                          
5 Drummond, J., & Embree, L. (Eds.). The phenomeno-
logical tradition in moral philosophy, (in preparation). 
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stemming from the naturalistic sciences and the 
technologies based upon them. For naturalism, Being 
qua Being is the “nature” of the naturalistic sciences 
and the most responsible cognitive approach is the 
method of that kind of science, although within 
philosophy, modern logic rather than mathematics is 
the formal technique. (To a phenomenologist for 
whom logic is as much a special science as 
mathematics is, much of naturalistic philosophy of 
science then often seems to consist of exercises in 
applied science.) 
 
After determining that naturalism is the opposite of 
phenomenology, I played the same intellectual game 
again, i.e., I asked what the opposite of naturalism is, 
and easily came up with a position that crucially 
appreciates culture and conscious life as well as the 
approaches necessary to investigate them. Generally 
speaking, then, I now tend to think that philosophical 
phenomenology is a philosophy of culture, whether or 
not that title is used. The difference between 
phenomenology and other philosophies of culture will 
be commented on presently. It could be that there are 
two major and opposed philosophical (if not 
intellectual) tendencies in the 20th century, and that 
they chiefly relate to two genera of science.  
However, this is something that might not be 
surprising to an historian of modern culture more 
sophisticated than I.  
 
Support for the notion that phenomenology is a 
philosophy of culture can be gathered from the fact of 
the many fruitful relations between philosophical 
phenomenology and only some scientific disciplines. 
For example, there is considerable phenomenological 
philosophy of naturalistic science, but there are no 
phenomenological tendencies within chemistry, 
botany, etc., while the opposite is the case for 
sociology or psychology.  
 
Let me insert here the suggestion that what I have 
been awkwardly and inadequately calling “non-
philosophical disciplines” might better be called 
“cultural disciplines,” and let me add that such 
disciplines include those of a practical species, such 
as nursing and psychiatry, and also broadly axiotic 
disciplines, such as architecture and literary criticism, 
as well as strictly theoretical or cognitive disciplines, 
i.e., the cultural sciences.6 There are external forces 
that lead disciplines of these three sorts to 
misrepresent themselves, especially when those of the 
practical sort seeking the cachet of scientificity and 
those of the theoretical sort are seeking the cachet of 
practicality, but I do not believe a philosopher is 
                                                          
6 Daniel. M., & Embree, L. (1994). (Eds.). Phenomenology 
of the cultural disciplines. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
obliged to go along with such forces - and when one 
does not do so, this taxonomy works. 
 
Turning now to the question of the unity of the 
century-old phenomenological tradition in relation to 
the variety of tendencies within its philosophical 
component and also within many different cultural 
disciplines, the first thing to recognize is that different 
disciplines and sub-disciplines each have their own 
different sets of problems and that these problematics 
will change over time. Hence, any characterization of 
the phenomenological approach must be both generic 
and capable of great specification. Moreover, if such 
a generic approach can be characterized, then how it 
is different from other philosophies of culture might 
also become visible. 
 
I recognize six features that seem to characterize the 
generic approach of phenomenology. 
 
(1) Phenomenologists tend to oppose accepting 
unobservable matters, e.g., the so-called outer world 
beyond the reach of sensuous awareness and also the 
unconscious in some psychological conceptions. 
Consequently, it is thus convergent with empiricism 
but not positivism because conscious life (but not 
ideal objects) is considered observable in at least 
classical empiricism. 
 
(2) As mentioned, phenomenology tends to oppose 
naturalism, which is not to say that there are not 
naturalistic emphases in some authors - Husserl to 
begin with - who believe one should analyze the 
experience of nature before exploring the remainder 
of the socio-cultural world. 
 
(3) Phenomenology tends to justify cognition - and 
also evaluation, and even action - on the basis of what 
Husserl called Evidenz, which is best called 
“evidencing” in English, i.e., the awareness of matters 
in the most clear, distinct, and adequate way possible 
for matters of the sort in question. 
 
(4) Phenomenology tends to consider ideal objects 
such as numbers and propositions, but also universal 
essences, to be observable, or ‘evidenceable’, in a 
broad signification of these terms. However, it 
deserves mention that few phenomenologists today 
believe ideal objects to exist in themselves. 
 
(5) Phenomenologists tend to practise reflective 
observation on what can be called encounterings as 
encounterings of objects and also on objects as they 
are encountered, although few use this terminology. 
Nevertheless, practically all phenomenologists would 
thus distinguish loving and the beloved as loved, 
remembering and the remembered as remembered, 
willing and the willed as willed, and so on. 
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(6) Finally, phenomenologists tend to recognize 
description of matters in universal, a priori, or eidetic 
terms as prior to explanation in terms of causes, 
purposes, or grounds. 
 
Two points deserve repetition. First, the terminology 
of “encountering” and the “encountered as 
encountered” is not widely shared, but the 
methodological positions characterized are. And, 
second, this is an attempt to characterize a generic 
approach that can be specified by tendencies that have 
predominated at different periods within the history of 
philosophical phenomenology as well as for the 
problematics of the other cultural disciplines (and 
note that philosophy is also a cultural discipline). 
 
A fifth period? 
With a new millennium before us, those who are 
committed to phenomenology may wonder how it 
might best be continued. I do not believe that there 
can be any doubt about it continuing, at least for a 
few decades. There is simply too much cultural 
momentum now built up for us to think otherwise. 
There are also several interesting new and renewed 
interests that suggest that a fifth period might be 
starting. 
 
Issues in the philosophy of technology and in 
environmental philosophy have been addressed in 
hermeneutical phenomenology, but can also be 
addressed in other ways. Most reflections on gender 
have of late been post-modern in style, but there is 
also now a very strong phenomenological interest in 
Simone de Beauvoir in this respect, and even talk of 
feminist phenomenology.7 In France, there is a great 
revival of phenomenological interest in religion. Then 
again, at least in the United States, there is renewed 
interest in race and ethnicity, which was added to the 
agenda by Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir 
nearly fifty years ago when they encountered 
America. And there is increasing interest in ethics and 
even politics.8 
 
If one believes in the relevance and importance of 
phenomenology, what can one do to advance it? So 
many soi disant phenomenologists actually spend 
                                                          
7 Embree, L. (Ed.). The existential phenomenology of 
Simone de Beauvoir. Dordrecht: Kluwer (forthcoming); 
Fischer, L., & Embree., L. (in press). (Eds.). Feminist 
phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
8 Thompson, K., & Embree, L. (2000). (Eds.). The 
phenomenology of the political. Dordrecht: Kluwer; 
Drummond, J., & Embree, L. (Eds.). The 
phenomenological tradition in moral philosophy (in 
preparation). 
 
their time on interpretation of texts in ways that are 
not especially phenomenological, and so much 
collective behaviour greatly resembles Bible study 
groups, that there is constant need to call continually 
for investigation of the matters themselves, which has 
always been phenomenology’s strength. That is by far 
the most important thing. 
 
If hermeneutical phenomenology has become history 
of philosophy, and if a fresh interest not in the texts 
themselves, but in the matters themselves has begun - 
which is what seems to have characterized the 
beginnings of the previous new internal tendencies 
and periods of the tradition - we might wonder about 
a fifth period. Is it beginning? What form will it take? 
My guess is that the general theme would then be 
collective as well as individual human life in the 
socio-historical world, a theme that is suitable for a 
reflective-descriptive philosophy of culture. The 
methodological shift would be away from any 
naturalistic emphasis on the one hand, although 
nature, non-human life included, would be a basic 
issue, and on the other hand, away from modeling all 
encountering of objects on the reading of texts as 
well. And maybe it would be called “cultural 
phenomenology.” 
 
To advance phenomenology, one can also work to 
foster communication among the hundreds if not 
thousands of phenomenologists in the more than 
twenty national traditions through conferences, 
lecture tours, visiting professorships, etc.; this is 
already happening for philosophical phenomenology 
and includes Latin America as well as Western 
Europe, and East and South Asia. I myself have 
recently been in Mexico, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil 
this year and hope to go to Eastern Europe in the 
immediate future. 
 
Even more contact is needed among the more than 
twenty cultural disciplines. At least in the United 
States these seem as isolated from one another as 
from philosophy. Moreover, they include relatively 
small percentages of members in each of their 
disciplines. Often referred to as “qualitative” or 
“interpretative,” these phenomenological tendencies 
seem to include what might be called refugees from 
positivism. The mainstreams in these non-
philosophical disciplines appear typically more 
oppressive than that which philosophical 
phenomenologists still struggle against in the United 
States. Sometimes, then, our colleagues in other 
disciplines go through a process whereby 
“phenomenology” first means “anything but 
positivism,” and then they later develop greater 
conceptual and methodological rigor. Philosophers 
might make themselves useful at that point.  
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Too often philosophers forget their deeper heritage of 
being not “specialists,” but “generalists,” in the 
signification that the practice of “philosophy” 
originally imposed no restriction on one’s intellectual 
delights. Hume was also an historian and Kant also a 
physicist. But for more than a century, philosophy has 
unfortunately been increasingly considering itself an 
academic specialty on a par with others and with its 
own problematics, methods, terminology, journals, 
departments, societies, etc., in which philosophers 
have come to speak and write chiefly, if not 
exclusively, for one another. In phenomenology, 
however, there has been at least some continuation of 
the earlier tradition, e.g., Alfred Schutz also taught 
sociology and social psychology and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty was a professor of psychology at the 
Sorbonne for several years. 
 
If philosophical philosophers returned to broader 
interests, they could connect with colleagues in the 
non-philosophical cultural disciplines, who might 
appreciate some help. But I urge my fellow 
philosophers to be prepared for different agendas of 
issues and specifications of the general approach. 
(Colleagues in other disciplines already struggle to be 
patient with philosophical interests that they do not 
share.)  
 
Moreover, the sets of issues that fall under the titles of 
art, class, environment, gender, morality, politics, 
religion, science and technology, are extraordinarily 
complex and multifaceted. Increasingly, they are 
receiving multidisciplinary treatment from what, 
accordingly, can be called “multi-disciplines.” 
Phenomenological philosophers can help form and 
otherwise develop such multi-disciplines, knowing 
from the outset that communication within such will 
not be easy.  
 
For philosophical phenomenologists, the benefits of 
communicating with cultural scientists can be great, 
especially if the fifth period is oriented toward basic 
culture. Not all philosophical problems have been 
formulated and much is to be learned. I hope that I 
live long enough to see whether my predictions 
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